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Abstract
We investigate the inﬂuence of loan and syndicate characteristics
and information disclosure and legal environment factors on the ar-
rangement timetable of bank loan syndications (measured as the time
elapsed from the launching until the completion of the deal) from 68
countries over the 1992-2006 period. Employing accelerated failure
time models from survival analysis methodology, we ﬁnd that loan,
syndicate, legal environment and information disclosure characteris-
tics which reduce agency problems related to syndication reduce the
arrangement timetable. Among the country level characteristics, in-
formation disclosure which reduces moral hazard due to informational
frictions between syndicate members appears to be the most impor-
tant driver of a faster deal arrangement timetable, while better credi-
tor rights protection increase the arrangement timetable, consistently
with recontracting risk issues.
Keywords : Syndicated loans arrangement timetable, Agency
problems, Information disclosure, Legal risk, Survival analysis, Ac-
celerated failure time models.
JEL Classiﬁcation : G21, C41.1 Introduction
The global syndicated lending market has reached 2.8 trillion USD and 6,580
issues in the third quarter of 20061. Currently, syndicated loans are an im-
portant source of external ﬁnance for ﬁnancial and non ﬁnancial companies,
comparable to bond markets and often larger than equity markets. For in-
stance, they represent 51% of total corporate ﬁnancing in U.S. (The American
Banker, 2000).
Brieﬂy, a syndicated loan is a loan granted jointly and under common
terms by a group of banks to a borrower. Usually, the borrower mandates
a lead bank (the arranger) to arrange the syndication. The terms of the
loan agreement are negotiated by these two agents. The arranger then ﬁnds
participant banks that grant a share of the loan, receiving compensation in
terms of fees and/or spread for this activity. Consequently, every syndicate
member has a separate claim on the debtor within a single loan agreement.
In a syndication, apart from several borrower related advantages2 and
lenders related advantages3, the deal arrangement timetable is of special in-
terest in this article. Factors which can speed up the arrangement timetable
of a loan syndication process allow to obtain funds more quickly. These fac-
tors are of primary interest for the borrower, who is the primary initiator
and beneﬁcent of the syndication. In a rapidly evolving economic and ﬁ-
nancial reality, fast and eﬃcient funding arrangement provides a competitive
advantage allowing to exploit existing investment opportunities4. Arrangers
1Thomson Financial (2006).
2Such as the ability to arrange cross border transactions, the restriction of negotiation
with one bank (the arranger), uniform terms and conditions, more competitive pricing
resulting in lower spreads, lower fees compared to bond issues, more ﬂexible funding struc-
ture, larger amount compared to public ﬁnance, and bilateral relationships with partici-
pants (Allen, 1990; Altunbas and Gadanecz, 2004).
3Syndication allows to diversify loan portfolios and thus avoid excessive single-name
exposure in compliance with the regulatory limits while maintaining a relationship with
the borrower. It helps to exploit comparative advantages of syndicate members in terms
of ﬁnancing and eventually in terms of information sharing (Song, 2004). Syndication
allows also to diversify income sources through the collection of fees, as well as to tackle
lack of origination capability and origination costs. Finally, it can serve as a sector risk
controlling device (see Schure et al., 2005).
4Syndicated loan announcement has a positive impact on borrower’s wealth through a
positive stock market response (see Preece and Mullineux, 1996).are also concerned by the arrangement timetable of a syndication, as quick
and eﬃcient deal arrangement and activation signals a more eﬃcient and rep-
utable arranger and thus enhances the probability of further syndications and
increases market presence. Other syndicate participants are also concerned
by arrangement timetable as a faster syndication process allows to beneﬁt
quicker from the compensation related to funding a tranche of the deal as
well as from potential bilateral relationships with the borrower. Finally, ﬁ-
nancial regulators can also gain valuable information from the knowledge
of individual and country level characteristics which inﬂuence the arrange-
ment timetable of loan syndication in order to set up appropriate regulatory
environment for the development of syndicated lending.
Loan syndication has also several drawbacks as it generates potential
agency problems due to informational frictions between the senior (arrangers)
and the junior (participants) members of the syndicate. Following Diamond
(1984), Gorton and Pennachi (1995), and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), bor-
rower monitoring by multiple creditors may lead to cost ineﬃciency and free-
riding. Hence, creditors usually delegate monitoring to one ﬁnancial inter-
mediary, the arranger in a syndicated loan context. As his monitoring eﬀort
is unobservable, the syndicate faces a moral hazard problem. Furthermore,
the latter is exacerbated by the fact that all participating banks have fewer
incentives for monitoring than one bank granting the full loan. Additionally,
the arranger collects private information through due diligence or through
a previous lending relationship. Therefore, he plays the role of an informed
lender on whom rely the other less informed lenders. If the information can-
not be credibly communicated to the participants or veriﬁed by them, an
adverse selection problem arises as the arranger may syndicate loans with
the less favorable information.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst empirical study investigating the du-
ration of international syndication arrangement. Former literature on syn-
dicated lending is relatively scarce and focus on other issues: identifying
the factors driving the decision to syndicate a loan (Dennis and Mullineux,
2000; Altunbas et al., 2005), the structure and composition of a syndicate
(Lee and Mullineux, 2004; Song, 2004; Fran¸ cois and Missionier-Piera, 2007;Suﬁ, 2007) and the impact of a syndicated loan on borrowers’s wealth (Preece and Mullineaux,
1996)5. We use a sample of more than 4,800 syndicated loans from 68 coun-
tries on the period 1992 − 2006. Employing accelerated failure time models,
we test the inﬂuence of individual and country level characteristics, such as
loan agreement and syndicate characteristics, as well as information disclo-
sure and legal risk, on the arrangement timetable of bank loan syndications.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
timetable of a loan syndication arrangement and discusses the determinants
of the arrangement timetable. Section 3 presents the accelerated failure time
model methodology and the data. Results are displayed and discussed in
section 4. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
2 Determinants of loan syndication timetable
arrangement
In this section we present in details the diﬀerent stages of a loan syndication
process and then discuss the individual and country level determinants of the
arrangement timetable.
2.1 Loan syndication process
Bank loan syndication can be considered as a sequential process, which can
be separated into three main stages6. During the pre-mandated stage, the
borrower solicits competitive oﬀers to arrange and manage the syndication
with one or more banks, usually its main banks7. From the proposals it
receives, the borrower chooses one or more arrangers that are mandated to
5The results show that the decision of loan syndication is notably related to the trans-
parency of the borrower and the maturity of the loan. It appears also that poorly perform-
ing banks tend, on average, to be more involved in syndications. Syndicates are structured
in order to enhance monitoring eﬀorts and to facilitate renegotiation.
6See Esty (2001) for a detailed analysis of the syndication process.
7The borrower chooses an arranger taking into consideration his placing power (ability
to attract participants into the syndicated loan), structuring ability, and experience with
arranging and pricing a deal.form a syndicate and negotiates a preliminary loan agreement8. The arranger
is responsible for the negotiation of key loan terms with the borrower, the
production of an information memorandum, the appointment of participants
and the structuring of the syndicate. The arranger’s role is normally com-
pleted once the deal is signed but it will often continue its involvement in
the facility by acting as agent who manages the syndicated loan. This role
involves such tasks as funds administration, interests calculation, covenants
enforcement, information sharing and re-negotiation management9. Under
fully underwritten loans (or ﬁrm commitment deals), the arranger takes the
entire transaction risk as he guarantees to provide the full amount of the loan
with all the terms and conditions agreed in advance. Under best eﬀort loans,
the arranger commits for the amount it will lend and agrees to arrange and
syndicate the balance of the loan. He can change the terms of the loan (e.g.
increase pricing or shorten maturity) to make it more attractive to partici-
pants. Some portion of the post-mandate phase is then repeated to attract
larger commitments or new participants.
During the post-mandated stage, the borrower and the arranger execute a
commitment letter that conﬁrms key terms, duties and compensation. This
syndication stage also involves preparing a documentation package for the
potential syndicate members, called an information memorandum, which is
produced collectively by the borrower and the arranger. It usually contains
information about borrower creditworthiness and loan terms10. The initial
set of targeted participants is strongly determined by the arranger. Their
previous experience with the borrower, the industry sector or the geographic
8The syndication can be sole or joint mandated, the latter involving the participation of
more than one lead bank. Such syndications are usually chosen by the borrower in order
to maximize the likelihood of a successful syndication, in terms of loan characteristics,
subscription and duration of the syndication process.
9These functions can be delegated to specialized agents, such as administrative agent,
documentation agent, collateral agent, etc. See Fran¸ cois and Missonier-Piera (2007) for an
empirical investigation of the motives for delegating these tasks to specialized agents.
10At this point, the arranger and the borrower usually agree on one of two basic syn-
dication strategies: a single-stage general syndication (the loan is distributed to a bank
group that is large enough to commit the desired amount) or a two-stage syndication with
sub-underwriting (the arranger and a small group of banks underwrite the full amount of
the deal before oﬀering shares to a broader group of banks).area are strong drivers for being chosen by the arranger to join the syndi-
cate11. A roadshow is then organized to present and discuss the content of the
information memorandum, as well as to announce closing fees and establish
a timetable for commitments and closing. The participants can make com-
ments and suggestions in order to inﬂuence the structure and the pricing of
the loan. They are also free to make commitments on any tier oﬀered. After
the roadshow, the arranger makes formal invitations to potential participants.
The ﬁnal step is to determine the allocation given to each participant. The
lead bank tends to target participants with the“largest appetite”for the loan
and make invitations to banks willing to supply most funds given the struc-
ture of the loan. Indeed, the arranger wants to avoid over-subscription, since
that can leave participants with smaller amounts than they were anticipating.
He also wants to avoid under-subscription, since it can leave an impression
of failure that will hurt future business. In the case of over-subscription, the
borrower may choose a larger loan or the arranger can scale back allocations.
If the syndication is under-subscribed, the arranger must either make up the
diﬀerence or change loan terms and re-market the deal.
The third and last phase takes place after the completion date when the
deal becomes active and the loan is operational, binding the borrower and
the syndicate members by the debt contract. The latter sets out the terms
and conditions of the loan: the amount, the purpose, the period, the rate of
interest plus any fees, the periodicity and the design of repayments and the
presence of any security.
2.2 Determinants of loan syndication arrangement timetable
We investigate the factors that inﬂuence the arrangement timetable12 of a
loan syndication - from the launching date until the completion day (when
the deal becomes active) - measured in days for each syndicated loan. This
process is illustrated on ﬁgure 1.
11However, Suﬁ (2007) shows that previous bank-borrower relationships play a more
important role in the arranger’s decision to invite a particular participant to the syndicate
than previous arranger-participant bank relationships.
12For clarity purpose, we will use the term timetable in the rest of the article.[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Loan syndication is a complex process involving speciﬁc agency and recon-
tracting risks. It involves several actors: the arranger, the participants and
the borrower. Each of them have an inﬂuence on the arrangement timetable
of the syndication process. At the completion of the deal, the loan contract
is binding, so that all the parties involved in the syndication should antici-
pate most of the problems and risks related to funding the deal during the
arrangement timetable. Depending on the attractiveness of the deal in terms
of terms and structure and the borrower risk proﬁle, participants will be more
or less willing to fund a share of the loan. The arranger can inﬂuence these
issues as he is concerned with over and under subscription problems and his
own reputation and market presence. Finally, the borrower is concerned with
the loan terms and structure and with the speed of funding availability.
Agency problems can interfere with the arrangement timetable of the
syndication process. First, the arranger possesses more information about
the borrower either because of the private information collected through a
previous lending relationship or through due diligence. This private informa-
tion creates an adverse selection problem as the arranger may be inclined to
syndicate loans from bad borrowers. However, such opportunistic behavior
generates reputation risk for the arranger and aﬀects negatively the success
of future syndications (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001). Second, the participant
banks delegate some monitoring tasks to the arranger in charge of the loan
documentation and notably of the enforcement of covenants and collateral.
As the eﬀorts of the lead bank are unobservable for participant banks, this
results in a moral hazard problem which is exacerbated with the opacity of
the borrower. Nonetheless, the arranger has less incentive to monitor the
borrower than if it were to lend the full amount of the loan (Pennachi, 1998).
Another important issue is related to borrower’s ﬁnancial distress which han-
dling is more complicated in a syndicate setting because lenders must reach a
collective decision. As shown by Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), the outcome
of negotiations in debt restructuring are aﬀected by the number of creditors,
by the allocation of security among the set of creditors, and by the characterof stringency of the voting rules among the creditors.
Hidden information problems should be positively related to the timetable.
For instance, funding opaque borrowers is more complicated as such borrow-
ers exacerbate adverse selection risk for the syndicate and thus increase the
timetable. However, arranger’s reputation risk can curb this eﬀect as faster
timetables can be considered as signals on arranger’s eﬃciency. Hidden action
problems should also be positively related to the timetable as well as reorga-
nization and recontracting risks. Here, borrower’s risk proﬁle, deal terms and
structure, and arranger reputation play an important role, as well as country
level factors such as information disclosure and legal risk. Ultimately, ar-
rangement timetable is aﬀected by the factors which have an impact on the
magnitude of agency problems related to syndicated loans. We discuss these
factors in the following subsections.
2.3 Loan and syndicate characteristics
We ﬁrst discuss the role of several loan and syndicate characteristics that
might impact the timetable of the syndication process. Loan size (measured
as the logarithm of the loan facility size) is expected to have a positive im-
pact on the timetable as larger deals imply more risk, are more plagued by
agency problems, and involve larger syndicates in terms of participants for
diversiﬁcation purposes. This makes the process more time consuming in
terms of information memorandum and roadshow until the lenders reach a
collective decision upon the deal terms as well as the ﬁnal formation of the
syndicate.
Lenders compensation also inﬂuences the timetable13. The senior mem-
bers earn an up-front fee (also called a praecipium or arrangement fee) in
13Lenders compensation comes in several forms. When the loan agreement is signed,
lenders receive closing fees to compensate them for the credit approval. Other participants
may expect to receive a participation fee for agreeing to join the syndicate, with the actual
size of the fee generally varying with the size of the commitment. Once the credit is
established and as long as it is not drawn, the syndicate members often receive a facility
fee proportional to their commitment, to compensate for the cost of regulatory capital.
As soon as the facility is drawn, the borrower may have to pay a per annum fee, usually
payable to cover the costs of administering the loan.exchange for putting the deal together. The most junior syndicate members
typically only earn the spread over the reference yield (such as six month Li-
bor). The level of the spread earned by these lenders is expected to positively
inﬂuence the duration, as a higher spread signals a higher risk proﬁle. As the
up-front fee is a part of the arrangers compensation, we expect a negative
coeﬃcient for this variable parameter as larger fees provide incentives to the
lead banks to complete the deal quicker.
Maturity of the loan is also considered, although whether it plays a posi-
tive or negative role is ambiguous. On the one hand, if we consider a positive
relationship between maturity and credit risk (Flannery, 1986; Agbanzo et al.,
1999), greater maturity should be associated with longer timetable. On the
other hand, if credit risk and maturity are negatively related (Dennis et al.,
2000), timetable should be shorter.
The structure of a syndicate can be viewed as an organizational response
to the agency problems (Pichler and Wilhelm, 2001; Lee and Mullineux, 2004;
Suﬁ, 2007). Hence, the structure and size of the syndicate should also have an
inﬂuence on the timetable. The size of the“core”of the syndicate is measured
with the Number of Arrangers variable14. We expect the latter to have a neg-
ative inﬂuence on the timetable as a larger syndicate “core” implies better
handling of agency problems related to monitoring of the borrower as several
delegated monitors are present, reducing moral hazard related to private in-
formation which is now spread among several arrangers (Lee and Mullineux,
2004; Suﬁ, 2007). Furthermore, a larger number of arrangers is usually as-
sociated to a higher likelihood of successful syndication, of which an integral
part is the speed of arranging the deal. Finally, it is likely that some of
the arrangers will act as specialized agents during the syndication, thus con-
tributing to a better handling of the process, through increased cost eﬃciency
and reduced informational asymmetry (Fran¸ cois and Missionier-Piera, 2007).
To account for the impact of publicly available information on the timetable
of syndication process, we include in our regressions a dummy variable (S&P
14The total size of the syndicate measured with the number of lenders is signiﬁcantly
correlated with the size of the loan, therefore we do not include this variable in our esti-
mations.Rating) equal to one if a Standard and Poor’s senior debt rating is available.
We expect a negative coeﬃcient since the existence of a rating mitigates the
adverse selection problem due to hard information on borrower’s creditwor-
thiness which reduce its opacity (Dennis and Mullineux, 2000) and therefore
allows to reduce the timetable.
We also test several characteristics that provide lenders with better pro-
tection in case of borrower distress. Such characteristics are expected to
exert a inﬂuence on the timetable of the syndication process mainly through
their impact on potential agency problems. Overall, we expect that better
protection of the lenders should reduce the timetable.
We take the presence of guarantors in the loan agreement into account,
with a dummy variable equal to one if at least one guarantor exists (Guar-
antor)15. A guarantor gives additional protection for the lenders, as it will
honor a part or the totality of the claim in case of loan default, such as
agency problems resulting from adverse selection are mitigated in line with
the better information owned by the arranger on the borrower. If that holds,
we should observe a negative coeﬃcient associated to Guarantor. However,
empirical literature on the role of collateral in loan contracts provides ev-
idence in favor of the ”observed-risk hypothesis” according to which banks
would be able to sort borrowers from information they have on their qual-
ity (Berger and Udell, 1990; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). As a consequence,
banks would ask more protection schemes from riskier borrowers and the
presence of a guarantor may signal a riskier loan and, consequently, a loan
plagued by greater agency problems, increasing therefore the timetable.
Additionally, we include a dummy variable (Sponsors) equal to one if the
loan is sponsored. A sponsor is usually an individual capital investor who
is involved in the project and might also act as an advisor and eventually
as an additional monitor of the borrower. Its presence should reduce agency
problems and therefore be negatively related to the timetable.
The presence of covenants, which aim at restricting the discretionary
power of the borrower, providing the lender with an early warning signal
15Since information on the presence of collateral is strongly missing in the database, its
inclusion in the estimations would have considerably reduced our sample.and eventually triggering loan default, is taken into account with a dummy
variable (Covenants) equal to one if the loan agreement includes ﬁnancial
covenants. The presence of covenants in a loan agreement is expected to re-
duce the risk of loan default (Rajan and Winton, 1995) and enhance the abil-
ity to monitor the borrower, thereby reducing the monitoring costs. Hence,
covenants should be negatively related to the timetable, as they reduce po-
tential agency problems from moral hazard behavior of lenders during the
monitoring process. However, empirical evidence tends to show the oppo-
site: a positive link between the presence of covenants and the probability
of default of the borrower (e.g. Foster et al., 1998). This is in accordance
with the“observed-risk hypothesis”, where riskier borrowers are oﬀered more
binding loan agreements, and implies a positive inﬂuence of covenants on the
timetable.
We also take debt seniority into account through a dummy variable (Se-
nior Debt) equal to one if the debt is senior. If it works as an eﬀective
protection for all the members of the syndicate, especially in case of bor-
rower distress and reorganization, the timetable should be shorter. If the
seniority does not apply equally to all syndicate members, then agency prob-
lems remain exacerbated and the timetable might be longer. Also, if the
“observed-risk hypothesis” hold, the request for seniority may result from
the perception of a higher risk of the borrower and therefore increases the
timetable.
We also control for the type and the purpose of the loan through the in-
clusion of dummy variables. Indeed, these characteristics might inﬂuence the
syndication process as they exhibit diﬀerent risk proﬁles (see Ackert et al.,
2007) and therefore have diﬀerent inﬂuence on agency problems within the
syndicate. We include a dummy variable if the loan is a term loan and ﬁve
dummy variables to describe the purpose of the loan, including corporate
purposes, debt repayment, leveraged buy out, project ﬁnance, and working
capital16. Depending on the magnitude and sign of the risk proﬁle eﬀect
of the loan purpose, timetable will be positively (higher risk) or negatively
16We do not provide variables for other purposes in our regressions, since they represent
less than 5% of our sample.(lower risk) aﬀected. Finally, dummy variables taking benchmark rate (Libor
and Euribor), facility issue year, geographical area and industry into account
are included in the estimations.
2.4 Country characteristics
We now turn to the description of country-level variables that inﬂuence the
duration. Qian and Strahan (2007) show that bank lending and ﬁnancial con-
tracts respond to legal and institutional environment, while Esty and Megginson
(2003) show that institutional factors might inﬂuence the syndication pro-
cess. Therefore, we also test the impact of legal environment, which aﬀects
both agency and recontracting risks, as well as of the level of information
disclosure, which aﬀects agency problems, on the timetable.
Our ﬁrst category of country-level variables is related to information dis-
closure within the country of the borrower. Regulatory features enhancing
information disclosure should have an inﬂuence on agency problems within
the syndicate and should therefore allow for shorter timetable. Indeed, as
shown by Jappelli and Pagano (2002), information sharing among lenders re-
duces agency problems and lowers credit risk. We proxy the level of informa-
tion disclosure through three variables. Public Credit Registries is a dummy
variable equal to one if a public credit registry operates in the country of
the borrower (Djankov et al., 2007)17. This type of disclosure inﬂuences the
level of informational frictions between the borrower and the syndicate. Risk
Management Disclosure and NPL Deﬁnition are two dummy variables equal
to one if bank regulation requires public disclosure of risk management tech-
niques18 and if the regulator provides a formal deﬁnition of non performing
loans respectively (Barth et al., 2005). That type of information disclosure
inﬂuences the level of information asymmetry between the syndicate mem-
bers. Public information regarding risk management of lenders is valuable for
17The registries collect information on credit histories and current indebtedness of bor-
rowers and share it with lenders. Public credit registries are databases managed by a
government agency (usually the central bank).
18An additional candidate variable for regulatory information disclosure was the obliga-
tion to publicly disclose oﬀ-balance sheet items, but we do not include it in our estimations
as this dummy variable equals one for more than 95% of the sample.the arranger during the selection process of potential participants to the syn-
dication as well as for further relationship within the syndication regarding
risk diversiﬁcation eﬀects and borrower monitoring. A regulatory deﬁnition
of NPL should also have a similar eﬀect.
Syndicated loans agency problems and debt restructuring eﬃciency can
be inﬂuenced by the country legal environment. Following a large body of
research on law and ﬁnance pioneered by LaPorta et al. (1997) and recently
completed by Qian and Strahan (2007), legal institutions and legal risk can
aﬀect the way banks perform their governance function, mainly monitor-
ing and re-contracting, and in consequence the syndication process and its
timetable. For instance, Esty and Megginson (2003) ﬁnd that lenders struc-
ture the syndicates in order to facilitate recontracting in countries where
creditors have strong and enforceable rights. Hence, our second category of
country-level variables takes legal environment into account. Two indicators
for legal institutions are included in our estimations. Protection of credi-
tor rights (Creditor Rights) and law enforcement (Rule of Law) are mea-
sured with the indexes provided by Djankov et al. (2007) and LaPorta et al.
(1997)19. The expected sign of the coeﬃcient for these both variables is
ambiguous. If recontracting in countries where creditors have strong and en-
forceable rights is diﬃcult, we can expect a positive coeﬃcient for Creditor
Rights. Similarly, if in high legal risk countries eﬃcient reorganization of a
distressed borrower is diﬃcult, we can expect a negative inﬂuence of Rule
of Law on the timetable. Apart from arguments regarding the handling of
borrower default and recontracting, we can also consider the impact of le-
gal risk on agency problems within the syndicate before the distress of the
borrower. Indeed, as better legal protection of banks mitigates the moral
hazard problem induced by syndication and decreases the need to monitor
the borrower, we can also expect the opposite coeﬃcients. Finally, we also
control for the legal origin into account with a dummy equal to one if legal
origin is English20.
19These indexes are scored on a scale from zero to four and from zero to ten, with a
higher score indicating better protection and a better enforcement of the law respectively.
20We obtain similar results when replacing the legal origin variable with the French
Legal Origin proxy.3 Methodology and data
The econometric methodology employed to investigate the determinants of
the timetable of syndication process as well as the data used for empirical
application are presented in this section. We begin by introducing terminol-
ogy common to survival analysis and describe hazard function estimators.
Then we present the sample and the descriptive statistics.
3.1 Econometric speciﬁcation
Since the dependent variable is the timetable of a syndicated loan arrange-
ment, the appropriate methodology is survival analysis which is used to an-
alyze data in which the time until the event is of interest, called an event
time.
Survival data are generally described and modelled in terms of two related
functions21, namely the survival and hazard functions respectively. Let T
represent the duration of time that passes before the occurrence of a certain
random event. Here T is the arrangement timetable of a loan syndication
process. The survival probability (also called the survivor function), S(t)
is the probability that the syndication process lasts from the time origin
(launching date) to a future time t, and is deﬁned as
S(t) = Prob(T ≥ t) = 1 − F(t), (1)
where F(t) is the cumulative distribution function for T.
The hazard is usually denoted by h(t) (also called instantaneous event
rate) and is the rate of transition of the syndication arrangement timetable
to completion, given it has not been completed before. Put another way, it
represents the instantaneous event rate for the syndication process which has
already lasted to time t. The hazard function is deﬁned formally by
h(t) = lim∆t→0















the negative of the slope of the log of the survival function.
When estimating hazard functions, we need to assume a hazard function
speciﬁcation. The latter can be using parametric survival models known as
accelerated failure time (AFT) models22. An AFT model speciﬁes that the
predictors act multiplicatively on the event time or additively on the log
of event time. The eﬀect of a predictor is to alter the rate at which the
syndication proceeds along time axis (i.e. to accelerate the time to event).
In this framework, the natural logarithm of the survival time ln(t) is
expressed as a linear function of the covariates X :
ln(t) = a + X
′β + ǫ, (4)
where a is the intercept and ǫ is the error term with density f(t). The
distributional form of the error term determines the regression model23. The
hazard function in an AFT model can be written as
h(t) = h0 exp(a + X
′β)(1 + exp(a + X
′β)t), (5)
where h0 is the baseline hazard rate. The hazard function is estimated
using maximum likelihood methods.
22Another possibility is to use the proportional hazards (PH) model, where h(t) =
h0(t)exp(X′β), given the predictors X and the baseline hazard rate h0(t). The latter
can be left unspeciﬁed and estimated using the Cox’s semiparametric partial likelihood
(Cox, 1972, 1975) or take a speciﬁc parametric form such as Weibull or exponential dis-
tributions. Within this approach, the hazards are supposed to be proportional over time.
This assumption is strongly rejected in our case (see section 4).
23With normal, logistic, extreme-value and three-parameter gamma density functions,
we obtain respectively log-normal, log-logistic, Weibull and generalized gamma regressions.3.2 Data
The sample of syndicated loans comes from the Dealscan database, provided
by the Loan Pricing Corporation (LPC, Reuters). Data concerning informa-
tion disclosure and legal risk come from LaPorta et al. (1998), Barth et al.
(2005), and Djankov et al. (2007).
The sample size is determined by information availability on the endoge-
nous variable and exogenous variables used in the estimations. The timetable
of the syndication process is measured in days since the launching date until
the completion date, when the deal becomes active. We use only completed
syndicated loans (no censoring) and we eliminate the outliers for the endoge-
nous variable : deals with timetable greater than the 99-percentile, equal to
243 days (above 8 months). We therefore have a sample of 4,807 syndicated
loans from 68 countries for the period between 1992 and 2006.
Mean duration of the syndication process equals 55.14 days (almost 8
weeks) with a standard deviation of 37.02 days. A histogram plot of the
duration is shown in ﬁgure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The plots of the survival, smoothed hazard and cumulative hazard func-
tions are displayed in ﬁgure 3.
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The survival and cumulative hazard functions are plotted using Kaplan-
Meier (KM) product-limit estimator (Kaplan and Meier, 1958) and Nelson-
Aalen (NA) estimator respectively. The survival function decreases quickly,
with half of the timetables lasting less than 50 days (ﬁrst and last quartiles
are equal to 32 and 69 days respectively). The hazard function is not con-
stant over time and exhibits two maximums. It is ﬁrst increasing to reach a
maximum shortly after the start of the syndication process (around 50 days),
then is relatively ﬂat, and ﬁnally increases again to reach a second maximum
around 225 days and then decreases. We can remark that the instantaneous
rates of syndication process completion for these two maximums are about30% and 60%. Put it another way, a syndication process lasting 50 days has
a probability of completing the next day of 30% while a syndication process
lasting more than 200 days has a probability of completing above 60%.
Table 1 lists descriptive statistics for the variables, while tables 4, 5, and
6 in the appendix provide their correlation coeﬃcients and their deﬁnitions
respectively.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
From table 1, we observe that the average loan size is 375 million USD
with an average maturity of almost 54 months (4,5 years). The average
compensation of lenders is 110.7 bp in terms of spread over the benchmark
rate, which is the Libor in 26% of the deals, and 52.7 bp in terms of up-
front fee. The average number of arrangers is close to 4. The covenants
are only included in 11.6% of loan contracts. The presence of guarantors
and sponsors is low, being observed in only 9.6% and 8.7% of the sample
respectively. More than a quarter of the loans are senior debt for the lenders.
Term loans account for 58.9% of the sample with the primary purposes being
debt repayment and LBO (19.5% and 19.4% respectively). Less than 10%
of the borrowers have a Standard & Poor’s senior debt rating. On average,
information sharing through public credit registries is wide-spread. Regula-
tory public risk management techniques disclosure is quite common (43.4%)
as well as formal NPL deﬁnition (49.1%). Credit rights are well protected
according to the mean value of the score (3.8) while law enforcement is at a
satisfactory level (6.9). More than 40% of the syndicated deals are governed
by English origin law24.
24Syndicated loans come from six broad geographical areas: Africa, Asia and Paciﬁc,
Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Middle East, and Western Europe, which
account respectively for 0.60%, 80.03%, 2.27%, 0.37%, 1.31%, and 15.42% of the sample.
The most important industry sectors are respectively Finance and Insurance (32.51%),
Manufacturing (29.91%) and Transport, Communication and Electricity (20.02%).4 Results and discussion
In this section, we present and discuss our estimations results and provide
some robustness checks in a second subsection.
4.1 Estimations results
As the proportional hazard assumption is strongly rejected with Schoenﬂed
residuals tests, we estimate an AFT model assuming a generalized gamma
distribution, as the latter provides the lowest log likelihood, as well as Akayke
and Schwarz information criterions25. We ﬁrst provide estimate results for a
baseline model (speciﬁcation 1) using a reduced number of covariates in the
regressions in the ﬁrst column of table 2. The respective plots of survival,
hazard and cumulative hazard functions for the baseline model are shown in
ﬁgure 4.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
As expected, the size of the loan, the spread and the maturity have a
positive inﬂuence on the timetable, while the number of arrangers has a
negative inﬂuence. Larger loans imply a greater bulk of complexity, risk
and agency problems, and therefore more time consuming arrangement. The
result regarding the maturity of the loan conﬁrms the positive relationship
between the latter and risk. Concerned about the speed of loan activation
and their own reputation as eﬃcient arrangers, the latter have a negative
impact on the timetable. We remark that the gamma distribution AFT
model provides a reasonable ﬁt to the data as we compare the plots in ﬁgures
4 and 3.
We now turn to the discussion of the results including additional loan
characteristics and information disclosure variables in table 2. We perform
25For all the estimations obtained with a gamma model that will follow, the magnitude
and the signiﬁcance of the covariates are very similar to those obtained with Weibull,
log-logistic and log-normal models. In order to not overload the article, we do not provide
these results, but they are available from the author upon request.3 additional regressions (Speciﬁcations 2-4), with varying combinations of
tested covariates. All regressions include the loan characteristics from the
baseline model. Speciﬁcation 2 includes additional loan characteristics, while
speciﬁcations 3 - 4 include also country-level variables, respectively informa-
tion disclosure which inﬂuences borrower-syndicate information asymmetry,
information disclosure which aﬀects between lenders information asymmetry
and legal risk.
Starting with the results provided in table 2, we ﬁrst remark that all the
results from the baseline hold and are therefore robust to the inclusion of ad-
ditional variables. Additional loan characteristics have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the timetable and the statistical properties of this regression are better
than the baseline model (speciﬁcation 1). Larger fees eﬀectively function as
an incentive device for the arrangers, with a negative and signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence on the timetable. Debt seniority and presence of guarantors are the only
variables from the set of lenders protection mechanisms proxies which have
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients26. The former suggests that seniority applies equiva-
lently to all lenders and thus provide them with a protection scheme which
reduces the timetable, whereas the latter reduces adverse selections prob-
lems thanks to the better information about the borrower. Hard information
availability through an external agency rating (S&P Rating) has no signiﬁ-
cant inﬂuence on the timetable, suggesting that most of the information is
produced privately by the arrangers and thus publicly available information
does not contribute to reduce agency problems. Finally, term loans posi-
tively aﬀect the duration because of higher management costs and agency
problems that they involve27, while debt repayment and project ﬁnance are
the only loan purposes which are signiﬁcant, with respectively negative and
26We have also performed four additional regressions of speciﬁcation 2, including each
time only one out of the four proxy variables of the various loan agreement characteristics
which aim at protecting the lenders (Guarantors, Sponsors, Covenants and Senior Debt).
The signs of other other coeﬃcients are not aﬀected, while only Senior Debt and Guar-
antors keep signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, the other lenders protection proxy variables being not
signiﬁcant.
27We have estimated the speciﬁcation 2 with a diﬀerent proxy for the loan type, using
a dummy variable equal to one if the loan is a revolving facility (18% of the sample). The
existing results are not aﬀected while the new proxy exhibits consistent signiﬁcant and
positive coeﬃcient.positive inﬂuence on the timetable. Project ﬁnance being more uncertain
and therefore more risky and plagued with more agency problems, timetable
of syndication related to such purpose is larger. The negative coeﬃcient for
Debt Repayment suggest that such purpose involves less risk as it might aﬀect
borrower’s capital structure in a proper way.
Regarding information disclosure variables, we observe that the presence
of public credit registries reduces timetable, according to its positive impact
on the reduction of informational asymmetries between the borrower and
the syndicate (Speciﬁcation 3). Similarly, public risk management process
disclosure has a negative inﬂuence on the timetable as it reduces information
asymmetry between the lenders. On the contrary, a formal deﬁnition of NPL
increases timetable (Speciﬁcation 4). This result can be explained in several
ways. First, ﬁnancial institutions may not adhere to the regulatory standards,
making the existence of a formal deﬁnition uninformative. Second, if binding,
this formal deﬁnition can be counterproductive for syndications as it might
appear that a high fraction of participant banks actually carry an important
burden of NPL28.
We now turn to the discussion of the estimates of the coeﬃcients in table
3 where we investigate the inﬂuence of legal risk on the timetable as well as
the major country-level variables which drive the timetable30.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
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We observe that a vast majority of the previous results hold. Covenants
is signiﬁcant in speciﬁcations 5 and 6 only, with a sign consistent with the
empirical evidence (Foster et al., 1998) in accordance with the“observed-risk
hypothesis”31. Legal risk inﬂuences the timetable in a way suggesting that
28We have also included an additional variable to estimate speciﬁcation 4, equal to one if
regulation stipulates that if one loan is non-performing, the other loans of a multiple-loan
customer are classiﬁed as non-performing29 This variable has a signiﬁcant and negative
coeﬃcient, while all other coeﬃcients remain unchanged.
30Due to signiﬁcant correlation between Public Credit Registries and Public Risk Dis-
closure (see table 5) we drop the latter variable in speciﬁcation 8.
31LBO purpose is also signiﬁcant at 1% level with a negative coeﬃcient in speciﬁcations
5, 6 and 8.problems related to borrower’s distress, reorganization and recontracting are
less of an issue for the syndication processes in our sample. The coeﬃcients of
Creditor Rights, and Rule of Law are more consistent with our argumentation
regarding the impact of legal risk on agency problems within the syndicate
before the distress of the borrower, where better legal protection of banks
mitigates the moral hazard problem induced by syndication and decreases
the need to monitor the borrower. Alternatively, handling borrower distress
might be less of an issue during the syndication arrangement, the latter be-
ing more driven by potential agency problems. However, the creditor rights
index becomes positive in speciﬁcations 7 and 8. Also, when we take into
account both type of information disclosure features, the information shar-
ing variable is not more signiﬁcant. These results suggest that asymmetry of
information between the syndicate members is more important for the syn-
dication arrangement and that better transparency regarding the lenders is
associated with an impact of stronger creditor rights on timetable, consistent
with reorganization and recontracting issues related to borrower’s distress.
As the intrinsic moral hazard problem within the syndicate is reduced due
to information disclosure imposed by regulation, the prospects of reaching a
satisfactory collective agreement in case of borrower’s distress might be more
diﬃcult in an environment where creditor rights are well protected (e.g. be-
cause of hold-up problems). Alternatively, we can also explain this result
stating that as better creditors protection reduce the attraction of joining a
syndicate (and enhances the motivation for bilateral lending), it increases the
timetable in order for the arrangers to ﬁnd participants and form a syndicate.
4.2 Robustness checks
We have performed numerous robustness checks of our results. Additional
variables come from the data already described in section 3. We have esti-
mated speciﬁcation 3 with a dummy variable equal to one if private credit
bureaus exist in the borrower country, instead of a public credit registries32.
32Such private arrangement for information sharing between lenders represents 43% of
our sample, but this variable is strongly missing and considerably reduces the sample size
(2,487 observations).Except for the Up Front Fee variable which becomes not signiﬁcant, all other
coeﬃcients are unaﬀected. The private credit bureaus dummy is signiﬁcant
and has a positive inﬂuence on duration, which is the opposite sign com-
pared to the public credit registries coeﬃcient. The availability of private
arrangements for information sharing appears to increase the timetable.
We must state here that private credit bureaus exhibit speciﬁc features
compared to public credit registries. The private databases should be more
precise33, but on average, half of the countries investigated by Jappelli and Pagano
(2002) have only information about borrowers’ arrears, and their coverage is
rather small. Furthermore, private credit bureaus are exposed to potential
conﬂicts of interest when they are owned by the lenders themselves. On the
opposite, public registries are managed by central banks and their content is
supervised by authorized stuﬀ, and participation in the registry is compulsory
and its rules are imposed by regulation. Their coverage is more universal al-
though less precise. However, on average, the information concerns defaults,
arrears and loan exposure (Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). Therefore, we can
explain the obtained result for Private Credit Registries stating that due to
drawbacks of private bureaus in terms of coverage, content details, potential
conﬂict of interest and lack of surveillance by regulator, the existence of such
information sharing device is counterproductive for the timetable.
We have then investigated in details the speciﬁcations 5 to 8 through
the integration of the various dummies which account for the Creditor Rights
variable34 as well as alternative proxies for Rule of Law35. We perform several
33Private bureaus merge data provided by the lenders with other sources of information
(courts, public registers, tax authorities, etc.) and contributors are granted access insofar
as the data provided is timely and accurate.
34Data come from LaPorta et al. (1998) and International Country Risk Guide. Secured
Creditor Paid First (mean: 0.93): equals one if secured creditors are ranked ﬁrst in the
distribution of proceeds that result from the disposition of assets of a bankrupt ﬁrm.
Restriction on Reorganization (mean: 0.55): equals one if the reorganization procedure
imposes restrictions, such as creditors’ consent, to ﬁle for reorganization. Management
Stays (mean 0.73): equals one if the debtor keeps the administration of its property
pending the resolution of the reorganization process.
35Namely corruption (mean 6.49), judicial system eﬃciency (mean 7.10), expropriation
risk (mean 8.32) and contract repudiation risk (mean 8.14) indexes. Data come from
LaPorta et al. (1998) and International Country Risk Guide. Corruption is an index
assessing the level of corruption in government, scaled from 0 to 10, with lower scores forregressions with various proxies of the features accounting for creditor rights
and with diﬀerent proxies of the rule of law. In every speciﬁcation (5, 6,
7, and 8), using one of the 4 proxies of the rule of law, all the coeﬃcients
remain unchanged while the three variables for creditor rights have consistent
coeﬃcients 36. All the alternative proxies for rule of law have signiﬁcant
and negative coeﬃcients, as expected (lower legal risk reduces the duration).
It appears that when controlling simultaneously for information disclosure
and legal risk, the latter inﬂuences the timetable in a manner consistent
with recontracting risk as moral hazard problems within the syndicate are
mitigated through disclosure and the arrangers might anticipate borrower
distress management already during the syndication arrangement.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated the determinants of the arrangement timetable of bank
loan syndications by analyzing the role of loan and syndicate characteristics,
informational disclosure and legal environment, inspired by recent literature
on the role of institutions on bank loans behavior (Esty and Megginson, 2003;
Qian and Strahan, 2007).
Overall, factors which mitigate agency problems related to syndicated
loans reduce the timetable, while features which exacerbate moral hazard or
adverse selection problems increase the timetable. These results are in line
with previous research, although investigating other aspects of loan syndi-
cation, which shows that the speciﬁc agency problems related to syndica-
higher levels of corruption. Judicial System Eﬃciency is an index assessing the“eﬃciency
and integrity of the legal environment as it aﬀects business”, scaled from 0 to 10, with
lower scores for lower eﬃciency levels. Expropriation Risk is an index assessing the risk of
“outright conﬁscation”or“forced nationalization”, scaled from 0 to 10, with lower scores for
higher risks. Contract Repudiation Risk is an index assessing the“risk of a modiﬁcation in
a contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down”, scaled from
0 to 10 with lower scores for higher risks.
36Negative for Restriction on Reorganization, and positive for Management Stays and
Secured Creditor Paid First. Reorganization restriction gives additional power to creditors
and ﬁring of potentially ineﬃcient managers in case of borrower’s distress enhances recon-
tracting eﬃciency. Creditors securitization coeﬃcient is consistent with recontracting risk
issues.tion and recontracting issues are the main drivers of the decision to syndi-
cate a loan and the structure of the syndicate (Dennis and Mullineux, 2000;
Esty and Megginson, 2003; Lee and Mullineux, 2004; Suﬁ, 2007).
Information disclosure through credit registries and regulatory features
allows to reduce the timetable, while legal environment has an impact con-
sistent with agency problems mitigation rather than recontracting issues.
Furthermore, when including both sets of factors, we ﬁnd that information
disclosure which inﬂuences moral hazard problems within syndicates is the
main driver of syndication arrangement timetable, while creditor rights af-
fects the latter in a manner consistent with recontracting risk issues related
to borrower distress.
Our empirical analysis can be extended in a number of ways. As the
arrangement involves several stages (such as closing date for instance) which
can collapse at an intermediary stage (deal canceled after launching), it would
be interesting to employ split-population duration models as well as compet-
ing risks modelization to investigate more deeply the drivers of the arrange-
ment timetable of loan syndication and its ﬁnal success.
This research would add valuable insight into our understanding of suc-
cessful syndications, which are already representing the major source of exter-
nal funding for corporate sector, an important risk and information sharing
device for ﬁnancial institutions, and are also of primary concern for ﬁnancial
regulators.
6 Appendix
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Figure 1: The sequence of events and stages of loan syndication arrangement.
t0 is the date of syndication launching (beginning of the post-mandate stage). t1 is the
date of syndication completion when the deal becomes active. t1 − t0 is the arrangement
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Figure 3: Plots of empirical distributions.The KM survival curve is a plot of the
KM survival probability against time. The NA cumulative hazard curve is plotted using
the NA estimator. The KM estimator is ˆ S(t) =
Q
i:ti<t(1−di/ni) while the NA estimator




ni, where ˆ S(t) is the empirical survival function, di is the number of
completions at time ti, ni the number of syndication arrangements at risk at time ti, and

















































































Figure 4: Plots of distributions.The plots represent survival, hazard and cumula-
tive hazard functions estimated from the results of the AFT model estimation under the
assumption of gamma (a, b, c) distribution.Table 1: Descriptive statistics
The table provides descriptive statistics for endogenous and exogenous variables com-
puted on the dataset of loan facilities, with a distinction of individual (loan and
syndicate) and country level (information disclosure and legal risk) determinants of
the duration. Deﬁnition of variables appear in table 6 in the appendix. Std. dev.:
standard deviation, Min.: minimum, Max.: maximum.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Descriptive statistics for individual-level variables
Duration 4,807 55.1367 37.0186 0 243
Loan Size 4,807 375 1,100 0,9404 1,780
Maturity 4,807 53.8417 36.0990 1 324
Spread 4,807 110.6984 79.8330 2.12 910
Upfront Fee 4,807 52.6986 43.6978 0 950
Number of Arrangers 4,807 3.6004 3.6992 1 36
Guarantors 4,807 0.0957 0.2942 0 1
Covenants 4,807 0.1157 0.3199 0 1
Senior Debt 4,807 0.2528 0.4346 0 1
Sponsors 4,807 0.0872 0.2821 0 1
S&P Rating 4,807 0.0616 0.2404 0 1
Descriptive statistics for individual-level control variables
Term Loan 4,807 0.5891 0.4920 0 1
General Corporate 4,807 0.1059 0.3077 0 1
Debt Repayment 4,807 0.1949 0.3962 0 1
LBO 4,807 0.0393 0.1944 0 1
Project Finance 4,807 0.1009 0.3012 0 1
Working Capital 4,807 0.0786 0.2692 0 1
Libor 4,807 0.2592 0.4382 0 1
Euribor 4,807 0.0811 0.2731 0 1
Descriptive statistics for country-level variables
Pubic Credit Registries 4,751 0.7116 0.4531 0 1
Public Risk Disclosure 3,814 0.4342 0.5175 0 1
NPL Deﬁnition 3,978 0.5938 0.4912 0 1
Creditor Rights 3,782 2.7343 0.9635 0 4
Rule of Law 4,245 6.9136 2.0854 1.9 10
English Legal Origin 4,751 0.4384 0.4962 0 1Table 2: Estimations results 1/2
The table provides estimation results from the gamma model with diﬀerent speciﬁcations (Speciﬁcations 1-4) in terms of covariates
(individual and country level characteristics). Deﬁnition of variables appear in table 6 in the appendix. Coef.: coeﬃcient estimate,
Std. Err.: standard error. N: number of observations, log L: log-likelihood, LR: likelihood ratio, AIC: Akayke information criterion,
SC: Schwarz information criterion. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coeﬃcients of covariates signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%
level. All syndications processes complete. Benchmark rate (Libor and Euribor), facility active year, industry and geographical areas
dummies included but not reported.
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2 Speciﬁcation 3 Speciﬁcation 4
Covariate Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Intercept −29.8176∗∗∗ 7.652 −71.2721∗∗∗ 9.243 −75.4471∗∗∗ 9.306 −94.7173∗∗∗ 10.9519
log(Loan Size) 0.0404∗∗∗ 0.009 0.0429∗∗∗ 0.009 0.0506∗∗∗ 0.009 0.0414∗∗∗ 0.011
Spread 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.001 0.0012∗∗∗ 0.001 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.001 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.002
Up Front Fee −0.0006∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.0007∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.0005∗ 0.003
Maturity 0.0026∗∗∗ 0.001 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.003 0.0016∗∗∗ 0.003 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.003
N. Arrangers −0.0172∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.01535∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.0152∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.0160∗∗∗ 0.003
Guarantors −0.0782∗∗∗ 0.029 −0.0422∗∗ 0.029 −0.0604∗∗ 0.030 −0.0607∗ 0.033
Sponsors −0.0324 0.033 −0.0423 0.033 −0.0520 0.036
Covenants 0.0164 0.033 0.0280 0.033 −0.0153 0.038
Senior Debt −0.2258∗∗∗ 0.045 −0.2313∗∗∗ 0.046 −0.2587∗∗∗ 0.050
S&P Rating 0.0090 0.035 −0.0055 0.037 −0.0031 0.037 0.0179 0.043
Term 0.1142∗∗∗ 0.019 0.1159∗∗∗ 0.019 0.1092∗∗∗ 0.021
Corporate −0.0258 0.031 −0.0296 0.031 −0.0097 0.035
Debt Repayment −0.0915∗∗∗ 0.025 −0.0976∗∗∗ 0.026 −0.1199∗∗∗ 0.029
LBO −0.0612 0.058 −0.0676 0.058 −0.0431 0.065
Project Finance 0.2307∗∗∗ 0.032 0.2237∗∗∗ 0.033 0.2570∗∗∗ 0.036
Working Capital 0.0269 0.034 0.0224 0.034 0.0060 0.039
Pub. Credit Reg. −0.0951∗∗∗ 0.021
Pub. Risk Disc. −0.1074∗∗∗ 0.021
NPL Deﬁnition 0.2140∗∗∗ 0.021
scale 1.7382∗∗∗ 0.019 0.5927∗∗∗ 0.007 0.5928∗∗∗ 0.0067 0.5888∗∗∗ 0.007
N 4,781 4,781 4,725 3,795
Log L −4,703.61 −4,525.67 −4,473.84 −3,567.72
LR 629.91∗∗∗ 726.78∗∗∗ 729.11∗∗∗ 787.12∗∗∗
AIC 9,453.21 9,123.34 9,021.68 7,211.44
BIC 9,602.08 9,356.34 9,260.73 7,448.61Table 3: Estimations results 2/2
The table provides estimation results from the gamma model with diﬀerent speciﬁcations (Speciﬁcations 5-8) in terms of covariates
(individual and country level characteristics). Deﬁnition of variables appear in table 6 in the appendix. Coef.: coeﬃcient estimate,
Std. Err.: standard error. N: number of observations, log L: log-likelihood, LR: likelihood ratio, AIC: Akayke information criterion,
SC: Schwarz information criterion. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ correspond to coeﬃcients of covariates signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10%
level. All syndications processes complete. Benchmark rate (Libor and Euribor), facility active year, industry and geographical areas
dummies included but not reported.
Speciﬁcation 5 Speciﬁcation 6 Speciﬁcation 7 Speciﬁcation 8
Covariate Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Intercept −24.3739∗ 13.068 −34.2232∗∗ 13.207 −81.5325∗∗∗ 15.842 −81.5750∗∗∗ 15.408
log(Loan Size) 0.0324∗∗∗ 0.011 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.002 0.0210∗ 0.013 0.0209∗ 0.012
Spread 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.002 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.002 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.002 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.002
Up Front Fee −0.0006∗∗ 0.003 −0.0006∗∗ 0.003 −0.0004 0.003 −0.0004 0.003
Maturity 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.003 0.0020∗∗∗ 0.003 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.004 0.0018∗∗∗ 0.003
Number of Arrangers −0.0113∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.0109∗∗ 0.003 −0.0134∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.0123∗∗∗ 0.004
Guarantors −0.052 0.033 −0.0486 0.033 −0.0543 0.037 −0.0431 0.036
Sponsors −0.0575 0.037 −0.0583 0.037 −0.0761∗ 0.041 −0.0409 0.040
Covenants 0.0760∗∗ 0.038 0.0763∗∗ 0.038 −0.0029 0.043 0.0170 0.040
Senior Debt −0.1969∗∗∗ 0.051 −0.2109∗∗∗ 0.051 −0.2204∗∗∗ 0.056 −0.2264∗∗∗ 0.055
S&P Rating −0.0225 0.042 −0.0200 0.042 −0.0070 0.048 −0.0253 0.046
Term 0.0844∗∗∗ 0.022 0.0879∗∗∗ 0.021 0.0921∗∗∗ 0.024 0.0899∗∗∗ 0.024
Corporate −0.0621∗ 0.035 −0.0732∗∗ 0.035 −0.0368 0.040 −0.0364 0.039
Debt Repayment −0.1058∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.1213∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.1242∗∗∗ 0.032 −0.1156∗∗∗ 0.031
LBO −0.1286∗∗ 0.065 −0.1305∗∗ 0.064 −0.0485 0.074 −0.0209 0.066
Project Finance 0.1807∗∗∗ 0.038 0.1780∗∗∗ 0.038 0.1685∗∗∗ 0.043 0.1860∗∗∗ 0.042
Working Capital −0.0205 0.038 −0.0247 0.037 −0.0940∗∗ 0.044 −0.0918∗∗ 0.044
Public Credit Registries −0.1322∗∗∗ 0.031 −0.0032 0.033
Public Risk Disclosure −0.0731∗∗ 0.032
NPL Deﬁnition 0.3826∗∗∗ 0.035 0.4103∗∗∗ 0.033
Creditor Rights −0.0777∗∗∗ 0.014 −0.0689∗∗∗ 0.014 0.0423∗∗ 0.020 0.0699∗∗∗ 0.018
Rule of Law 0.0754∗∗∗ 0.025 0.0375∗∗∗ 0.007 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.008 0.0344∗∗∗ 0.008
English Legal Origin 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.007 0.0800∗∗∗ 0.025 −0.0515∗ 0.031 −0.0035 0.027
scale 0.5684∗∗∗ 0.007 0.5666∗∗∗ 0.007 0.5586∗∗∗ 0.008 0.5579∗∗∗ 0.008
N 3,418 3,418 2,648 2,786
Log L −3,055.99 −3,046.90 −2,344.26 −2,447.15
LR 554.64∗∗∗ 572.81∗∗∗ 657.95∗∗∗ 659.69∗∗∗
AIC 6,187.97 6,171.80 4,768.52 4,979.66
BIC 6,421.17 6,411.13 5,003.78 5,216.95Table 4: Correlation coeﬃcients of individual-level variables
The table provides correlation coeﬃcients for individual-level explanatory variables. log(Loan): log(Loan Size), Up Fr. Fee: Up Front Fee, Mat.: Maturity, Num. Ar.: Number
of Arrangers, Guar.: Guarantors, Spons.: Sponsors, Cov.: Covenants, Corp.: Corporate, Debt Repay.: Debt Repayment, Proj. Fin.: Project Finance, Work. Cap.: Working
Capital. Deﬁnition of variables appear in table 6 in the appendix. Due to lack of space, correlation coeﬃcients which are signiﬁcant at the 5% level are marked in bold.
log(Loan) Spread Up Fr. Mat. Num. Guar. Spons. Cov. Senior Term Corp. Debt LBO Proj. Work. S&P
Fee Ar. Debt Loan Repay. Fin. Cap. Rating
log(Loan) 1.00
Spread -0.04 1.00
Up Fr. Fee 0.02 0.44 1.00
Mat. 0.19 0.13 0.22 1.00
Num. Ar. 0.52 -0.13 0.04 0.12 1.00
Guar. -0.02 0.02 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 1.00
Spons. 0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.04 1.00
Cov. 0.22 0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.06 1.00
Senior Debt 0.50 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.30 0.00 0.02 0.46 1.00
Term Loan -0.20 0.17 0.12 0.09 -0.14 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 1.00
Corp. -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 −0.08 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.00 1.00
Debt Repay. 0.24 -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.17 0.23 -0.09 -0.17 1.00
LBO 0.17 0.36 0.28 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.33 0.02 -0.07 -0.10 1.00
Proj. Fin. 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.32 0.00 0.00 −0.01 -0.05 -0.12 0.17 -0.12 -0.17 -0.07 1.00
Work. Cap. -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06 -0.10 1.00
S&P Rating 0.01 −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.03 −0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 1.00Table 5: Correlation coeﬃcients of country-level variables
The table provides correlation coeﬃcients for country-level explanatory variables. Pub. Cred. Reg.:
Public Credit Registries, Pub. Risk Disc.: Public Risk Disclosure, NPL Def.: NPL Deﬁnition, Eng. Leg.
Origin: English Legal Origin. Deﬁnition of variables appear in table 6 in the appendix. Correlation
coeﬃcients which are signiﬁcant at the 5% level are marked in bold.
Pub. Cred. Pub. Risk NPL Def. Creditor Rule Eng. Leg.
Reg. Disc. Rights of Law Origin
Pub. Cred. Reg. 1.00
Pub. Risk Disc. 0.60 1.00
NPL Def. -0.14 -0.25 1.00
Creditor Rights 0.09 -0.32 0.03 1.00
Rule of Law 0.46 0.26 -0.19 -0.25 1.00
Eng. Leg. Origin 0.37 0.11 0.20 0.41 0.27 1.00Table 6: Variables deﬁnition
The table provides a brief description and the sources of information for endogenous and exogenous
variables, with a distinction of individual (loan and syndicate) and country level (information
disclosure and legal risk) factors.
Variable Description Source
Individual-level variables
Duration Duration of the syndication arrangement timetable
since the launching date until the completion date,
measured in days.
Dealscan
Loan size Logarithm of the size of the loan (in million USD). Dealscan
Spread Spread over the benchmark rate, measured in bps. Dealscan
Fee Up front fee measured in bps. Dealscan
Maturity Maturity of the loan in months. Dealscan
Number of ar-
rangers
Number of arrangers in the syndicate. Dealscan
Guarantors = 1 if there is at least one guarantor. Dealscan
Sponsors = 1 if there is at least one sponsor. Dealscan
Covenants = 1 if the loan agreement includes ﬁnancial covenants. Dealscan
Senior debt = 1 if debt is senior. Dealscan




Term loan = 1 if the loan is a term loan. Dealscan
Corporate pur-
poses





= 1 if the loan purpose is debt repayment funding. Dealscan
Working capi-
tal
= 1 if the loan purpose is working capital funding. Dealscan
Project ﬁnance = 1 if the loan purpose is project ﬁnance funding. Dealscan
Libor = 1 if the benchmark rate is the Libor. Dealscan









= 1 if regulator impose to banks public disclosure of
their risk management procedures
Barth et al.
(2005)




Creditor rights An index aggregating four aspects of creditor rights.
The index ranges from zero (weak creditor rights) to
four (strong creditor rights)
Djankov et al.
(2007)
Rule of law An index indicating the law enforcement. The index
ranges from zero (weak enforcement) to ten (strong
enforcement)




= 1 if the legal origin of the company or commercial
code of the country is English
Djankov et al.
(2007)             
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